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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

HERBERT BURTON and FLORENCE
BURTON, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents
vs.

Case No. 14245

ALAN H. COOMBS, CARLA H.
COOMBS, his wife, FOUR
SEASONS MOTOR INN, INC., a
Utah Corporation and FOUR
SEASONS MOTOR INN II, INC.,
a Utah Corporation,
Defendants and Appellants.

RESPONDENTS BRIEF ON APPEAL
***

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action by plaintiffs to recover damages for
the breach of a management contract relating to the operation
and management of a motel in St. George, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After a trial before the Honorable J. Harlan Burns,
sitting without a jury, the court found that defendant Four
Seasons Motor Inn, Inc., had breached its contract with the
plaintiff respondents and awarded a money judgment covering
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the period of time from the date of breach to the date of
judgment, together with attorney's fees and interest.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek to have the factual determinations
of the lower court affirmed.

However, respondents have

filed a cross-appeal claiming that the lower court erred in
failing to find that defendants were bound by a partial
settlement offer accepted by the plaintiffs in open court,
and further erred in applying an improper measure of damages.
Respondents therefore seek to have the judgment modified in
these particulars.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants statement of facts is not entirely accurate.

It assumes numerous factual matters which were in dis-

pute and which were contrary to the weight of the evidence
and the findings of the court.

It omits several material

facts, it refers to bits of testimony out of context, and it
is filled with statements and conclusions not supported by
the evidence.

For this reason the respondents desire to make

their own statement of facts that are relevant and material
to the issues in this appeal.
Defendant and appellant Alan H. Coombs (hereinafter
referred to as Coombs) was the promoter of a corporation and
a forty-unit motel in St. George, Utah known as Four Seasons
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Motor Inn.

Coombs, an attorney at law, was also the builder

of the motel (TC-3)1.

In the early part of 1972 Coombs was

looking for an investor-manager and became acquainted with
the plaintiffs and respondents, Herbert and Florence Burton
(hereinafter referred to as Burtons) through a real estate
agent (T-5,TC-3).

At that time Mr. Burton worked for a

hardware company in Salt Lake City, and the Burtons had been
looking for an investment in a motel (T-5), although they had
never had any prior experience in any motel operation (T-62).
The initial contact was followed by various negotiations between the parties, the execution of a preliminary agreement
(T-6), and eventually the execution of a Stock Purchase Agreement and Management Agreement (T-8, Exhibits P-2,P-3).

The

terms of the agreement between Burtons and Coombs called for
investment by the Burtons of $80,000.00.

Burtons sold their

home in Salt Lake City and liquidated their savings and stocks
and bonds and made this investment (T-13).

For the $80,000.00

investment the Burtons received 1) a management contract for
the operation of the forty unit motel2, 2) 20% of the stock of
the corporation and, 3) the right to be represented on the
-3-

1. The record contains two transcripts, one for defendant Cootibs and the
other for all other witnesses. References to the Cocmbs transcript will
be designated at TC.
2. The management contract was the most important part of the consideration.
It was a Digitized
30 year
contract and provided that the managers would receive
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
10% of the gross revenue
from OCR,
themay
operation
Machine-generated
contain errors. of the motel.

Board of Directors of the corporation (Exhibits P-2,P-3).
The remaining 80% of the stock in Four Seasons Motor Inn,
Inc. was issued to Coombs and his wife, Carla H. Coombs (TC-8).
The only consideration given by Coombs for his stock was his
promoting services in finding the land, and arranging for
financing and construction of the motel (TC-9-12).

At the

time Burtons made their investment the motel was still under
construction and was approximately 50-70 percent complete
(T-14).

The Burtons moved to St. George on April 10, 1972

and the motel opened for business on May 6, 1972 (T-15).
Burtons managed the motel from May 6, 1972 until approximately
April 30, 1973 (T-16).

During the time that Burtons managed

the motel it was acknowledged by Coombs that Burtons were
good managers and did an excellent job (TC-14).
Problems between Burtons and Coombs began to develop
when Coombs began to promote a second motel complex (an eighty
unit motel and convention center) across the street from the
Four Seasons Motor Inn (TC-14).

The written agreement be-

tween Burtons and Coombs (Exhibit P-2) had anticipated the
eventual construction of a second motel and had given the
Burtons an option to purchase an equivalent interest.

However,

Coombs had told the Burtons that he did not expect to build
the second motel for a period of at least five years (T-21,64,80).
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Coombs advised Burtons in approximately July of 1972 that he
was going ahead with the second motel (T-21).

The Burtons

objected because they felt it was premature in that the
first motel had not yet had time to become established
(T-21).

Coombs advised them that he was going ahead anyway

(T-21).

He told the Burtons/ however, not to worry and that

he would give them a management contract for the new motel
to be built across the street (T-21,23).

Coombs proceeded

with his plans for the second motel and organized another
corporation which he named Four Seasons Motor Inn II, Inc.
The Burtons did not invest in the second motel and an interest was sold to another investor, Derrill Larkin.
During the time the second motel was under construction Burtons began to worry about their position (T-23).
In a number of conversations Coombs told Mrs. Burton "just
donf t worry about it you are going to be the managers, you
are going to be protected, I have always dealt fairly with
you and just don't worry" (T-23).

Burtons on numerous occa-

sions, expressed their concern and apprehension not only to
Coombs, but to Derrill Larkin (T-172).

Burtons didn't like

the situation, but continued to work along with Coombs hoping
that everything would eventually be worked out.
As the second motel neared completion, Burtons became
more and more concerned about their management contract.
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They

tried to formulate a contract on various occasions but could
not come to any definite proposal on the terms.

In a meet-

ing held on approximately September 30, 1972, the Burtons
were offered a proposal which was unacceptable (T-24,66).
At that meeting Coombs offered to replace their 10% management contract with a 3% contract which the Burtons considered
to be grossly unfair (T-24,66).

The meeting ended on a

friendly note and Coombs continued to assure Burtons that
this was merely a preliminary offer and that eventually something satisfactory could be worked out (T-25,66).

In approx-

imately February of 1973 Coombs reduced another proposal to
writing and presented it to the Burtons (T-25,69; Exhibit P-5).
This proposal had several objectionable terms, the most unacceptable being that Coombs was offering the Burtons a one year
contract on the combined motel operation to replace their
existing 30 year management contract (T-27,68).

When the

written proposal was rejected Coombs told the Burtons emphatically that they were never going to get anything more than
a one year contract and repeated that to them many times up
until April 30, 1972 (T-27).

On another occasion Coombs told

Mr. Burton that he would never get more than a one year contract; that he was an attorney and at times people sued him;
but that he always turned the matters over to his counsel and
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would never hear anything more about it (T-69) .
The second motel opened in April of 1973 (T-27).
At the time of the opening the Burtons were still hoping
to work something out and assisted for two weeks in getting the second motel opened and going (T-28,29). Frustrations were continuing to build and on approximately
April 25f 1973/ the Burtons demanded a showdown to get
something resolved (T-28)•

The parties met and Coombs

asked "what is it going to take to make you happy", to
which Mrs, Burton replied "permanency"/ pointing out that
they had bought a thirty year contract with all their
savings to assure themselves an income for life and that
they weren't going to give it up (T-29).

Again the response

from Coomb was "a one year contract and that is it" (T-29).
Another meeting was held on April 29/ 1973/ in which Coombs
made another unreasonable take it or leave it offer and
then told them in the meeting that he would make their
stock worthless, their management contract had no value,
and that they were merely employees of his and he didn't
want them to operate the place anymore, and that they were
through (T-30/72/103).

By this time the two motels had

been constructed to appear to the public as one motel under
the same management; the office had been closed on the

-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Burtons1 side of the street and moved to the new motel;
the telephone system had been taken out of the first motel;
the cash registers and office equipment had been moved
across the street; a new office sign had been installed;
and a neon sign on the old building was installed designating that the office was across the street (T-104).

The

next day when Mrs. Burton attempted to go to work in the
new offices she was ordered off the premises by Coombs
(T-31).
Based upon the above facts the trial judge concluded in his findings of fact and conclusions of law that
Coombs, in acting for the defendant corporation Four Seasons
Motor Inn, Inc., had breached its management contract with
the Burtons by making it effectively impossible for them to
continue to perform under their management agreement (R-285).
The court further found that there had been considerable
negotiating back and forth over a new management agreement;
that no new agreement was ever reached; that the original
management agreement was still in full force and effect;
and that Burtons had never done anything to breach the original contract (R-282).

The court also found that after the

breach had taken place any subsequent offers of re-employment
were conditional upon Burtons operating the motel under a

-8-
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new and unsatisfactory agreement and that they were justified in refusing to do so (R-284,311).
As a part of this case Burtons also filed other
claims and causes of action against defendant Coombs and
defendant Four Seasons Motor Inn II, Inc. in the nature
of derivative relief seeking damages for mismanagement of
the corporation, co-mingling of assets, improper use of the
corporate name by Four Seasons Motor Inn II, Inc., improper
withdrawals of capital from the corporation, the issuance
of watered stock, and the making of secret profits (R-1,21).
These issues were severed at the pre-trial and it was ordered
that they be tried in a separate action (R-140).

Thus, the

only issues on appeal in the present action relate to the
breach, or lack of breach, of the management contract and
the consequences of said breach.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED THAT APPELLANTS
BREACHED THE MANAGEMENT CONTRACT.
After a very lengthy trial in this case the trial
court made findings that the appellants breached the management contract with the Burtons, and that the Burtons had
never done anything to breach their agreement.

-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The entire

issue as to who breached the contract is a factual issue,
and there was a sharp conflict in the testimony on many
critical points.

Appellants have attempted to convince

the reviewing court that the lower court committed error
by stating and arguing their version of the facts. However, on appeal the respondents are entitled to have the
court consider all of the evidence, and every inference
and intendment fairly arising therefrom, in the light most
favorable to t h e m ^ Toomers Estate vs. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 121 Utah 37, 239 P.2d 163.

The reviewing

court will not substitute its judgment for that of the
trial court and is not concerned with a preponderance of the
evidence but only with the question of whether there is
substantial evidence to sustain the judgment.

Leon Glazier

and Sons, Inc. vs. Larson, 26 Utah 2d 429, 491 P.2d 226.
On appeal, the evidence in favor of the respondent must be
considered to the exclusion of contrary evidence.

Hoggan &

Hall & Higgins, Inc. vs. Hall, 18 Utah 2d 3, 414 P.2d 89.
The court is further obliged to consider uncontradicted
evidence in composite with all of the other evidence.

Super

Tire Market vs. Rollins', 18 Utah 2d 122, 412 P.2d 1 3 2 . /
In light of the above fundamental and basic rules
of appellant review, the evidence supporting the findings
and judgment of the lower court may be summarized as follows:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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It is undisputed that the Burtons didf in fact,
have a management contract.
were not in dispute.

The terms of the contract

It was a thirty year contract and

provided for compensation at the rate of 10% of the gross
revenue of the operation.

It was purchased by the Burtons,

together with a minority stock interest of doubtful value,
for the sum of $80,000.00.

It is further undisputed that

the Burtons operated under the contract for a period of
almost one year and that they did an excellent job as managers.

From this point the evidence began to get conflicting

as to the circumstances of the Burtons1 termination.
If the trial court believed the testimony of the
Burtons it appears clearly that there was a great deal of
concern, apprehension, disagreement and unhappiness about
the building of the second motel.

These concerns were ex-

pressed on numerous occasions and they had been given assurances upon assurances that a satisfactory arrangement would
be worked out.

Up until the actual opening of the second

motel the parties were still on friendly and amicable terms.
It was only after the second motel was actually
opened that the Burtons came to realize that a satisfactory
offer for the management of the combined operation was not
going to be extended.

Among other things, the Burtons were
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simply not willing to give up a thirty year contract for
which they invested their life savings of $80,000.00 for
a one year contract on the combined operation.

There was

a conflict in the testimony as to conversations to the
effect that the one year was to be a trial period, after
which the parties could revert back to the old contract the Burtons strongly denied the existence of such conversations (T-68), while Coombs testified that such was discussed.
The fact is, however, that the proposed agreement prepared
by Coombs (Exhibit P-5) which Coombs requested the Burtons
to sign and which he claimed at trial embodied the terms of
a modified oral agreement, clearly provided for a one year
term.

It purports to be an "addendum" to the original

management contract.

It provides at paragraph 2 on page 1

that "the management agreement entered into by both parties
on February 15, 1973, shall be incorporated into this agreement and shall apply to the operation of both units with the
following exceptions".

Then listed under the exceptions is

the provision at paragraph 7 stating that, "this agreement
shall continue for a period of one (1) year with the intent
that it shall continue thereafter if the management proves
to be satisfactory to all persons".

Nowhere in this pro-

posed contract does it say that the parties will revert

-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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back to the old contract after a one (1) year trial period.

Had the Burtons ever signed such an agreement, the

above provisions would clearly modify the original management contract as to its terms.

The Burtons, further, would

have been forever precluded under the Parol Evidence Rule
to claim that the parties had some oral agreement different
from what was reduced to writing.

The affirmative testimony

of the Burtons was also to the effect that they were told
not once but on many occasions when the negotiations started
to break down that all they would ever get was a one (1)
year contract, that he (Coombs) was eighty percent and they
were twenty percent so that he could fire them at will,
and that their management contract had no value.

And so,

when the final showdown came and the Burtons refused to
accept the terms that were being forced upon them, Coombs
told the Burtons they were both through and later ordered
Mrs. Burton off the premises.

Coombs' contentions that

he then offered to sever the combined operation and reinstate Burtons to the management of the forty unit motel are
flatly denied by the Burtons.
It is further clear from the evidence in this case
that at the time the Burtons were fired by Coombs, the
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physical circumstances were such that it would have been
impossible for them to have continued their contract.

By

that time, the office had been moved across the street.
All of the telephone equipment and office equipment had
been moved, signs had been changed and installed designating that the office was across the street.
There was some testimony that after the blow up,
Coombs asked Mr. Burton to come over across the street and
work in the combined operation.

Certainly Mr. Burton had

no obligation to go over and work without a contract in an
operation in which he had no ownership interest.

Further,

had he done so, the defendants would have claimed his working to be an acknowledgment of the existence of some new
oral contract—which is the very position that they took
throughout the whole case in attempting to imply a new contract from the two weeks help that the Burtons extended when
the second motel was opened.

The court might note on pages

3 and 5 of the Pre-Trial Order (R-142) that up until the time
of trial defendants1 position has always been that the management contract was modified, and that plaintiffs' breached
the modified agreement.

On page 5 of the Pre-Trial Order

defendants specifically claim that the conduct of the parties

-14Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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was a basis for establishing the modified contract.

Nowhere

in the Pre-Trial Order or in the other pleadings do the
defendants contend that the amended agreement was only
temporary and that the parties could later revert back to
the first agreement.
The evidence in this case further showed that after
the Burtons had been terminated Coombs leased all of the
assets of Four Seasons Motor Inn, Inc. to Four Seasons Motor
Inn II, Inc. (Exhibit P-8,PC-19) for a period of thirty
years.

At trial Coombs offered to cancel the lease, claim-

ing the power to do so inasmuch as he owned eighty percent
of both the lessor and lessee corporations.

It is unreason-

able to think that Burtons would have known this.

They

naturally would assume that a formal twenty year lease is
a twenty year lease.
The hypocracy of appellants1 evaluation of the facts
is further demonstrated by their tender of performance made
shortly before the commencement of the trial (R-150).

They

have continually attempted to make it appear as though Burtons could have returned to their management contract at
any time, yet even in open court when Burtons attempted to
accept an offer of re-employment it was immediately refused
(this point is discussed in detail under Point I of respondents1 cross-appeal).
-15Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A recent case that may be of some significance to
the court is Holley vs. Sullivan, 28 Utah 2d 3, 497 P.2d
630.

In that case, plaintiff was employed by the defen-

dant as a hostess and waitress in a cafe.

She was fired

under the following circumstances as quoted by the court:
"After a couple of months of seemingly
harmonious relations, there was a falling out
over the work of another employee, and the
plaintiff called the defendant a "dirty
double-crossing liar", whereupon the defendant said, "young lady, you can go home right
now". In the next breath, he told her not
to leave. However, she did leave, saying,
"You fired me, and now you rehire me in less
than two seconds, and you're not playing cat
and mouse with me".
Under this evidence, the trial judge
found that the plaintiff was fired; and while
he may not have ruled as he did, yet we do
not say that he could not so find."
The above merely illustrates the type of evidence upon which
a finding of improper termination may be based.

Plaintiffs

place no special significance on this case, as the facts
of plaintiff in the instant case are so much stronger than
Holley that there can be no reasonable comparison.
Respondents would contend, not only that there is
sufficient evidence to support the findings of the trial
court, but that the total evidence clearly preponderates
in favor of them.

It is simply unreasonable to believe

-16Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that the Burtons would simply have walked off the job and
risked losing their entire lifetime savings without being
ordered to do so.

The greater credibility lies with the

respondents.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN FAILING TO
FIND THAT RESPONDENTS BREACHED THE MANAGEMENT CONTRACT.
Point II of appellants1 brief is filled with statements of fact that are disputed.

The question of whether

appellants, or whether the respondents, breached the management contract is a factual issue and Burtons1 responsive
argument as to the factual issues is fully covered under
Point I of this brief.
It may again be significant to note, however, that
appellants' argument under Point II is entirely inconsistent
with the claims that were made in the trial court.

In the

pleadings in Pre-Trial Order (R-140) it has always been the
position of appellants that the original management contract
was modified by a subsequent oral agreement and that the
Burtons breached the new agreement (not the old), by refusing to manage the combined operation of the two motels.
Now that the trial court has made findings that no new
agreement was ever made between the parties (R-284), the
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appellants make an about face and claim that it was the
original contract that was breached by the Burtons.

This

is but a typical example of how the appellants have continually vacillated their position, to fit the expediency
of the moment, and have kept the Burtons in a continual
state of frustration.

It is little wonder that the trial

court didnft think much of the appellants1 credibility.
CROSS-APPEAL
POINT I
—

,

a..

THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE DEFENDANTS WERE BOUND BY THEIR PARTIAL SETTLEMENT OFFER WHICH
WAS ACCEPTED IN OPEN COURT.
The facts upon which respondents rely for their
cross-appeal are not included in their statement of facts
and will therefore be stated herewith.

Approximately one

week before the trial, the defendants tendered an offer to
the plaintiffs which was put in the form of a formal pleading and filed in the case (R-150).

The pleading was entitled

"Reaffirmation of Tender of Performance" although Burtons
evidence was to the effect that such an offer had never
been previously made.

Under the terms of the written offer,

the defendants agreed to the following:
(a)

To reinstate the plaintiffs in their management contract.
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(b)

To change the name of the convention center
and motel operated across the street by
Four Seasons Motor Inn II, Inc.

(c)

To perform whatever acts are required to
sever the two motels and allow the plaintiffs
to properly perform under their management
contract.

(d)

To permit all parties to continue to pursue
without prejudice any claims against the
other to the date of acceptance of the tender.

During the course of the trial counsel for the defendants
on three occasions made reference to the offer and made
representations to the court that it was available for
acceptance by the plaintiffs even during the trial (unfortunately the oral arguments of counsel in making these representations were not reported, (T-3,26,141).

Burtons had

not responded to the offer and had proceeded through trial
on a theory of anticipatory breach.

That is, they claimed

that they were entitled to damages over the full unexpired
period of the management contract.
damages was to this effect.

Plaintiffs proof of

They called an expert witness

Dr. Boyd Fjeldsted, a consulting research economist from
the University of Utah Economic Business and Research Department to testify on the subject of damages.

Dr. Fjeldsted

made a very scholarly study and concluded that after taking
into consideration the projected future receipts of the motel,
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the value of the furnished apartment to the managers,
reductions for present worth, and additional reductions
for age based upon motel industry statistics, that the
total damages to Burtons on an anticipatory breach theory
was $237,760.00 (See T-112-134).
After plaintiffs had rested their case, the
court met with counsel in chambers.

He did not make

any rulings, nor did he tell counsel how he was going
to rule, but suggested that the parties ought to get the
case settled.

In following the suggestion of the court,

plaintiffs decided to accept defendants1 offer.

They

thereupon re-entered the courtroom and made the following statement on the record (T-141):
"Now, then, the court will recall Civil
No. 4940. Counsel are present as is the
parties, are you ready to proceed?
Mr. West: Yes, your Honor. I have a
matter which I would like to present at this
time to the Court. Following our discussion
in chambers with the Court we have met with
counsel and discussed this matter with our
clients and at this time, your Honor, we would
like to refer to the Court the formal tender
of performance which is in the file, dated
October the 3rd of 1974, it would have been
filed last week, and at that time the defendants in this case made a tender of performance
where, and I might just review this,
(The document was then read in its entirety
into the record)

-20Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

At this time, your Honor, the defendants or
the plaintiffs in this case make an unconditional
acceptance of this tender that has been proposed
and that counsel has represented throughout the
trial. We will go back and resume the management, so it would be our position at this time,
then, that this is without prejudice as far as
any other claims that we might have, and so the
only issue, as I see it, at this point, would be
the damages in the interim period, what they are
and if in fact we are entitled to damages during
that period."
Mr. Lybbert then immediately repudiated the offer after which
the following additional record was made:
"The Court: Well, the Court is advised of
the statement by Mr. West in behalf of the plaintiffs in this case, they accept unconditionally in
form and content your reaffirmation of tender of
performance filed in this case and I take it at the
time that you would like to withdraw that; on the
other hand, it is under advisement and the Court
is advised of your position at this juncture in
the lawsuit, Mr. West. And so the record is clear,
the Court, and the record should show that the Court
did in fact call counsel into chambers and off the
record and in an effort to encourage the parties
in this case to settle their differences if they
could at this juncture in the lawsuit, at least
indicated some of the views of the Court on some
of the issues and state of the proof. However, Mr.
West and Mr. Lybbert, Mr. Jackson, Mr. Poelman,
you all agree with the Court that the Court advised
you, don't misinterpret the statements of the Court,
the Court didn't intend that to be any ruling but
just to assist you, if it could, in reaching some
settlement among yourselves, and that is correct,
isn't it, Mr. West?
Mr. West: Yes, your Honor, I understand. I
don't make any claim that the Court made any ruling
in Chambers or that the Court indicated how the
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Court would rule on the issues, and as far as
our acceptance of this tender is concerned it's
been represented right in this courtroom not
once but on at least three occasions that I can
remember by Mr* Lybbert himself that that offer
is outstanding, it is still outstanding, it
remains outstanding throughout the course of
this trial and it has never been—I would represent to the Court that it's never been revoked
and that our acceptance is an unconditional
acceptance."
By making an unconditional acceptance of defendantsf offer
plaintiffs gave up their claim for damages under the anticipatory breach theory.

The terms of the written offer pro-

vided that it was without prejudice as to any existing claims
up to the date of acceptance, and the balance of the case
was devoted to resolving the factual issues of who breached
the management contract, and the amount of plaintiffs' damages during the interim period to the date of reinstatement
under the offer.
It is also significant that the court at the conclusion of this case made a statement to the effect that he
thought defendants were bound by their tender offer (I-193).
However, when the judge made his final ruling he ruled in
favor of the Burtons on the breach of contract issue and
concluded "that no good purpose would be served by ruling
as a matter of law, that the acceptance of the offer is
binding on any party, and hence rules that it is not binding"
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(T-286; see also separate transcript of court proceedings,
pages 13,14).

Obviously, the trial judge felt in light

of his findings and judgment that a ruling on the acceptance of the offer made no difference.

But the fact is

that it made a very important difference.

That is, that

the part of the offer relating to a change of name by
the second motel is left unresolved.
extreme importance to the Burtons.

This point is of
Under the ruling of

the court the Burtons have gone back and resumed the
management of the original motel.

While, of course, there

is no evidence before this court as to what has happened
since the judgment, it takes little imagination to realize
the confusion and problems that would exist where two
motels with separate ownership across the street from
each other in the same town attempt to operate under the
same name.

Burtons gave up a very valuable right when they

accepted defendants1 offer in open court.

They gave up

the right to pursue any additional claim for anticipatory
breach.

They are now entitled to the full benefits of

the contract that came into being, which includes the
changing of the name of their competing corporation.
At no time prior to acceptance was defendantsf offer
ever revoked, nor was there ever any intervening counteroffers.

-23-
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Burtons1 position is that under the most elementary contract principles of offer and acceptance, both parties
are bound by the contract that was formed.

If the posi-

tion of the parties were reversed, it is inconceivable
to think that plaintiffs could have revoked the contract
and continued to seek damages for anticipatory breach
after having made an unconditional acceptance in open
court; likewise defendants must be bound by the terms
of their own proposal.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED BY AWARDING PLAINTIFFS INSUFFICIENT
DAMAGES.
A.

Plaintiffs' Measure of Damages in This Case.

Having found that the defendants breached the management
contract and that the Burtons were justified in not returning to work until after the issues in this case were resolved,
it became the duty of the trial court to determine and award
damages.

In this case the trial court arbitrarily awarded

plaintiffs the sum of $1,000.00 per month from the date of
breach until the date of the court's decision (R-285,287,289).
Burtons contend that the figure of $1,000.00 is not supported
by the evidence.
Ordinarily the measure of damages for the breach of
an employment contract by the employer is the amount that
the discharged employee would have received or would have
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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earned had the contract been performed.

22 Am. Jur. 2d

Damages, Section 70, Russell -vs- Ogden Utah Ryf 122 Utah
107, 247 P.2d 257.
In this case, the rate of compensation to the
employee managers is tied to gross receipts from the motel
operation.

Thus, it is impossible to determine with exact

precision what the damages are.

Under such circumstances,

the principles set forth in the case of Gould -vs- Mountain
States Telephone Company, 6 Utah 2d 187, 309 P.2d 802 become very important.

That case involved a suit for damages

against the telephone company by an attorney for failure to
include his name in the telephone directory.

The argument

of the defendant was that the cause of action should fail
because of the impossibility of determining damages.

In

rejecting that argument, the Supreme Court held as follows:
"Where the plaintiff has shown actual loss
of business during the period as a result of
defendant's breach of contract, he will not
be denied recovery because the exact amount
of damages cannot be readily ascertained. To
this effect is the rule laid down by this
court that where the fact of substantial
damages shown, the court or jury cannot award
nominal damages only on the ground that the
amount of substantial damage has not been
shown with reasonable certainty.
The rule against recovery of uncertain
damages is generally directed against uncertainty
with respect to cause rather than to measure or
extent, so that a party who has broken his contract will not ordinarily be permitted to
escape liability because of uncertainty in
amount of damage resulting, and the fact that
the full extent of damages for breach of
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Justice Crockett concurred specially in favor of allowing
damages and stated as follows:
"I am also in accord with the idea expressed
in the main opinion, that where substantial
damages shown to have resulted from the breach
of a duty, the fact that the injured person
may have difficulty in proving the amount of
his damage should not resound to the benefit
of the wrongdoer. Rather than conferring an
advantage upon him, doubt should be resolved
in favor of compensating the injured person
for his injury. We can see no objection to
placing before the jury all of the facts and
circumstances of the case having any tendency
to show damages so as to enable them to make the
most intelligible and probable estimate which
the nature of the case will admit."
With the above principle in mind, we can examine the evidence in the instant case.

According to the evidence of

Newel Jackson (the accountant) taken by deposition (T-lll),
the gross receipts for the first year of operation of Four
Seasons Motor Inn, Inc., was $138,000.00.

This did not

include the month of April, 1973, which would have been
the last month of the fiscal year.

Mrs. Burton testified

that the gross receipts for April attributable to the forty
unit motel only was in excess of $20,000.00 (T-18).

Also,

the testimony was that in May of 1972, being the first month
of operation, that the motel opened on May 6 with only 5
or 6 units ready for occupancy and that all of the units
were not completed until Decoration Day (T-15).
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If the

motel had been open throughout the entire month of May,
1972, it conservatively would have produced at least
another $10,000.00 of revenue.

Thus, the income for the

first year's operation was $169,000.00 calculated as
follows:
Gross receipts as shown on
books of corporation
$138,000.00
Additional receipts for April, 1973 . .
21,000.00
Estimate of additional receipts
for May, 1972, if the motel had
been completed
10,000.00
TOTAL
$169,000.00
The above is close to Coombs projection which was made prior
to construction that the revenue would be $163,520.00
(Exhibit P-4).
It is reasonable to assume that the motel would
have done better in its second year of operation.

Partic-

ularly is this true in light of Mrs. Burtonfs testimony that
the repeat business was building up substantially (T-18),
and in light of Mr. Coombs' testimony that there were two
increases in room rental rates after the first year (T-116,117).
Based upon the above evidence, plaintiffs contend
that the receipts for the second year had the Burtons been
permitted to continue with their contract would have been
at least $180,000.00.

Ten percent (10%) of that amount
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would equal $18,000.00 or $1,500.00 per month.

It is

undisputed that the last month for which the Burtons
were paid was April, 1973, and that nothing has been
paid since that time.

All of the damage evidence was

virtually undisputed.

Thus, the court should have award-

ed plaintiffs damages based upon $1,500.00 per month and
not $1,000.00 per month.
B.

Under the Facts of this Case, No Mitigation

Factors Should be Considered by the Court.

In its find-

ings the court made the statement that in awarding damages
it had taken into consideration all matters of mitigation.
It is Burtons1 position that it would have been improper
in this case to consider any mitigating circumstances.

The

authorities are generally in agreement that the breaching
employer has the burden of proof to establish that substantially similar employment opportunities were available in
the same locality and that the employee cannot be compelled
to take a different type job or a job in a different area.
Crillo -vs- Curtola, (Cal.) 204 P.2d 941; Farrell -vs- School
District, 98 Mich. 43, 56 N.W. 1053. No such evidence was
offered by the defendants in this case, and they have failed
in meeting their burden of proof.
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Aside from the above, however, there is an even
more compelling reason why it would be improper to consider any mitigation in this case.

The leading case upon

which plaintiffs rely is Chioda -vs- General Waterworks
Corporation, 17 Utah 2d 425, 413 P.2d 891.

In that case,

plaintiff was the owner of the Bear River Telephone Company in Northern Utah.

He sold all of his corporate

stock to the defendant, and, in connection with the sale
of the business retained a ten year employment contract.
After the sale was made, the plaintiff worked for a short
period and was discharged.

The grounds for the discharge

were claimed dishonesty, disloyalty and insubordination
of the employee.

The plaintiff thereupon filed suit to

recover his compensation under the employment contract.
The court found that there had not been sufficient justification for the discharge and awarded plaintiff judgment
for the full balance that he would have earned had the
contract been performed.

One of the issues on appeal was

whether the trial court should have required mitigation of
future damages.

On that issue, the court held as follows:

"There are two reasons why the trial court
was justifiably not impressed with the defendant's insistence upon mitigation of damages.
First, as the deal was worked out, the payment
of this salary for ten (10) years, could well
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be regarded as a deferred payment of part of
the overall consideration plaintiff required
for his telephone company. Second, inasmuch
as the plaintiff is 60 years old, it would
be unrealistic to conjecture as to his ability
or desire to get another position and earn
money for the purpose of mitigating defendant's
damages."
In other words, since the employment contract was part of
the consideration for the sale of the business, the court
in Chioda did not consider the employment contract in the
usual sense.
instant case.

The very same considerations apply to the
We are dealing with a management contract

that was purchased.
it.

The Burtons paid $80,000.00 to acquire

We are not dealing with a typical contract where the

services to be performed are the consideration for the
contract.

Here, a very substantial part of the consider-

ation was the payment of money.

It is totally unreasonable

to believe that Coombs would have offered a thirty year contract with compensation at the rate of ten percent of gross
revenues to anyone, regardless of their capabilities, in
the absence of the $80,000.00 investment.

If the reasoning

of Chioda is followed by the court, it is clear that no
mitigation factor should be applied.
C.

Effect of Offers of Re-employment.

Although

the trial court did not appear to have reduced plaintiffs'
damages because of defendants alleged and fictitious offers
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of employment, respondents in answer to Point III of
appellants' brief feel that perhaps some comment should
be made on this point.

Plaintiffs acknowledge that under

certain circumstances, an employee may be under a duty
to accept an offer of re-employment if it is a bona fide
offer and made in good faith.

Defendants1 formal offer

which they tendered in court was designated as a "reaffirmation" of tender of performance.

As a part of their

evidence, they offered a letter dated April 2, 1974 (after
the date of the Pre-trial herein) upon which they apparently
rely in establishing the prior offer (Exhibit D-10).

The

implication would be that plaintiffs should be precluded
from recovering damages after April of 1974.
In order for an offer of re-employment to have any
effect whatsoever, it must be made in good faith and it
must be totally unconditional in that the employee must
not be required to suffer any loss or give up any rights by
accepting it.

Larsen -vs- Fisher, 48 N.W. 2d 502. The

letter of April 2 is obviously a conditional offer in that
it compels the plaintiff to recognize a modified agreement
that plaintiffs claim did not exist.

It, further, does

not preserve the existing claims of the Burtons.

Also, the

claimed offer was rather empty in that it recites that
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Burtons should resume the duties of management bur provides for no practical way in which the duties can be
performed.

Further, no resumption of salary was ever

extended.
A case involving the good faith of an offer of
re-employment is Grey -vs- Pacific Section Cleaner Company,
155 Pac. 469.

This case involved the question of whether

the employee was ever in good faith given the opportunity
to resume his duties.

Again, there was an employment con-

tract for a definite period.

When the plaintiff did not

receive his monthly paycheck, he sued for his back wages
and was immediately fired.

Two days later, he began an

action for wrongful discharge.

The offer of re-employment

that the defendant relied on in mitigation of damages was
made through a series of five letters.

The plaintiff refused

the offer of re-employment because he felt it was made in
bad faith.

The court made some interesting observations

on what constitutes a good faith offer:
"It is to be observed that all of this
occurred after the action was begun. The
contents of the letters of the defendant indicate that they were prepared either by the
attorneys for the defendant or under their
direction. The correspondence and the circumstances shown in the evidence justify the
inference that the defendant was much more
desirous of laying a foundation for mitigation
of damages in the suit than of taking the
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plaintiff back into its service. The motive
is, of course, apparent. A reasonable person would easily perceive that the continuance
of Grey in the service of the company after
the occurrences leading up to the beginning
of the action would most probably be disagreeable and undesirable to both parties, and would
necessarily cause friction between them. Without further discussion, we think it's sufficient
to say that upon all the evidence the court was
justified in drawing the conclusion that the
offer was made in bad faith, and that the finding
to that effect is supported by the evidence."
The court also observed that the apparent ambiguity in the
offer of re-employment as to payment of costs of plaintiff
for legal action taken was another circumstance tending to
show bad faith on the part of the plaintiff.
Approximately one week before the trial date, the
defendants made the first unqualified offer of re-employment
to the plaintiff.

It is obvious that this document was pre-

pared by defendants' attorney for the sole purpose of mitigating damages and was not a good faith offer.

This is

apparent by the defendants' attempt to withdraw the offer
after the plaintiff accepted the same.

This course of

action on the part of the defendants confirmed plaintiffs
continuing concern that the offer was not made in good faith.
Another case concerning good faith offers of reemployment is Dahl -vs- the SS Amigo, 202 F. Supp. 890.
This case involved an action by two seamen for breach of
contract of employment and some other relief relating to
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maritime law not applicable here.

However, the breach

for contract of employment is applicable in that the
court relies on the common law in formulating its decision.

These officers were employed for one year and dis-

charged without cause after three months.

Only after the

plaintiffs obtained counsel did the defendant offer them
re-employment.

The court held as follows:

"It is established law that upon the breach
of the contract of employment, the employee
must endeavor to mitigate his damages by seeking
other employment; and if a bona fide offer of
re-employment is made by the same employer, it
must be accepted in mitigation of damages. An
offer of re-employment must be a genuinely sincere and bona fide offer, made in good faith,
to be considered in mitigation. Whitmarsh v.
Littlefield, 46 Hun 418, 11 N.Y.S. 815. if
there are reasonable grounds for rejection of
an offer of re-employment, the discharged
employee is under no obligation to accept
re-employment. Levin v. Standard Fashion Company, 16 Daly 404, 11 N.Y.S. 706. If anything
has occurred that would render further association between the parties offensive, then in
that event, the employee is not obligated to
accept the offer or re-employment. Levin v.
Standard Fashion Company, supra; Birdsong v.
Ellis, 62 Miss. 418; Connell v. Averill, 8 App.
Div. 524, 40 N.Y.S. 855. The court is not
convinced that there was a sincere bona fide
offer of re-employment. However, if the offer
of re-employment was such, the court is of the
opinion that the existing circumstances (that
is the wrongful discharge, the living conditions that prevail aboard the vessel, the fact
that there was no unconditional tender of wages
along with the offer of re-employment, the ill
feeling that had been engendered, and the fact
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that libelants had engaged the services of
attorneys) constituted reasonable grounds
for the libelants' rejection of the offer of
re-employment."
All five of these elements are present in the case before
the court.
The case of Price -vs- Davis, 173 S.W. 64, stands
for the proposition that ill will can be an insuperable
barrier between the parties justifying not accepting an
offer of re-employment.

The court held as follows:

"In the quarrel between the parties which
preceded the discharge, things were said and
done which tended to place an insuperable
barrier between them and to make their further
association in business unprofitable and degrading to the plaintiff.
The rule in such cases, as stated in Birdsong v. Ellis, supra, is that: 'If anything had
occurred to render further association between
the parties offensive or degrading, or if the
plaintiff had engaged in any other employment
incompatible with his return to the defendant,
he might reject the offer with safety and
without suffering diminution of his damages on
the ground that it was an offer he should have
accepted'."
If the wrong of the employer in discharging
the employee is of such character that the parties
could not be restored to their former relationship, then an offer of re-employment should not
be construed as imposing upon the employee any
obligation to accept it, and his refusal to
accept such offer should not subject him to the
penalty of the diminution of the damages caused
by his wrongful discharge."
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As mentioned previously, the only unconditional
offer of re-employment made by the defendants was made one
week before trial under circumstances that were apparently
more concerned with mitigating damages than with actually
renewing the business relationship of the parties.

The

authorities cited show that plaintiffs were justified in
not accepting defendants1 offer until the time they did so.
Under the circumstances of this case, plaintiffs were
clearly entitled to interim damages at the rate of $1,500.00
per month as calculated under Point IIA of Respondents
Cross-Appeal.
D.

Damages in the Event Respondents Fail Under Point

I of Their Cross-Appeal.

In the event the trial court is

upheld in its determination that defendants are not bound
by their offer in open court which was unconditionally
accepted by the respondents (see Point I of this CrossAppeal) then in such event plaintiffs are likewise not
bound and would be entitled to revert to their original
claim of total and anticipatory breach.

In Restatement of

Agency 2d, Section 432, Comment B, it is stated as follows:
"A breach of duty by the principal may
be partial or total; a partial breach may
or may not be material. If the breach is
not material the agent has no privilege to
refuse to continue but can maintain an
action for the breach; if it is material,
but not total, the agent can refuse to conDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tinue until the breach is cured, a material breach may become total. If the breach
is total, the agent can elect to terminate
his obligations under the contract and maintain an action for the entire amount due
under the contract, or he can offer to continue, maintaining action for the amount due
at the time of the breach. . ."
Revocation of the offer of re-employment by the defendants
herein would be an acknowledgment on their part that plaintiffs will not be permitted to perform their contract in
the future and would constitute a total breach.

In this

event, the testimony of plaintiffs1 expert witness on
damages would become of critical importance.

Dr. Fjeldsted

testified that the total damages, including the reasonable
value for the loss of the apartment in future years, was
$237,760.00.
side.

This figure is on the ultra conservative

It assumes gross receipts for the base year of

$169,000.00 which is the figure projected by Coombs and
is substantially less than the actual first yearfs operations.

It assumes a discount factor for present worth of

7.25 percent.

It considers a reduction for age factors

based upon professional studies.

It assumes a cost of

living increase of only 2.25 percent, and it is projected
only until age 75 and allows nothing for the last ten years
of the contract.

If the court permits defendants1 offer
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to remain revoked plaintiffs would be entitled to an immediate judgment of $237,760.00.
CONCLUSION
Based upon all the arguments and authorities as
cited herein, respondents respectfully urge the court as
follows:
1.

To affirm the factual determinations of the

trial court regarding the breach of contract issues.
2.

To modify the judgment of the lower court by

determining that appellants are bound by all of the provisions of their written offer which was accepted by plaintiffs in open court.
3.

To modify the amount of damages awarded plaintiff

by increasing the award from $1,000.00 per month to $1,500.00
per month to conform with the evidence.
4.

In the alternative, to award plaintiffs total

damages of $237,760.00 as established by the evidence.
5.

To award plaintiffs costs and reasonable attor-

n e y ^ fees for this appeal (the management contract provides
for attorney's fees to the prevailing party, and the award
of attorney's fees included in the judgment only covered
the services rendered through the date of trial).
Respectfully submitted,
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS,
WEST & SCHAERRER
David E. West
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